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What Does the CISG Have to Say About Smart
Contracts? A Legal Analysis
Anna Duke ∗

Abstract
Smart contracts—contracts written into lines of code that automatically execute all or parts
of an agreement—are a relatively new technology, which has raised many questions regarding
their validity and formation. This Comment looks at smart contracts under the lens of the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) and analyzes
what its provisions have to say on the validity and formation of a contract. This analysis is written
from the internationalist perspective, which favors applying the CISG to issues it addresses even
in cases where domestic law might apply. Moreover, this Comment argues that a smart contract
used as an international sales contract, which embodies an entire agreement within its code, is
valid under the CISG because it can meet the formation requirements of the Convention. More
specifically, such a contract can show some clear indication of the parties’ intent, and include an
offer, an acceptance, and some sufficiently definite indication of the goods, price, and quantity. In
addition, smart contracts have the potential to promote international trade, an outcome that is
consistent with the goal of the Convention’s creation. The purpose of this analysis is to address
legal issues unique to smart contracts and to reduce legal uncertainty by filling an interpretational
gap regarding the CISG’s applicability to smart contracts.
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I. I NTRODUCTION
A smart contract is a set of computer code that “automatically executes all
or parts of an agreement and is stored on a blockchain1-based platform.” 2 In
addition, it lies on a spectrum between an agreement that is entirely in code and
the mere automated performance of a traditional paper contract. 3 Because smart
contracts are designed to reduce transaction costs by making it difficult and costly
for parties to breach an agreement, 4 interest in smart contracts is on the rise as
more businesses seek to use smart contracts for boosting efficiency in
international trade. 5 In addition, an increasing number of experts are writing about
the promise of smart contracts to reduce transaction costs in international trade. 6
According to Ramesh Gopinath, the IBM Vice President of Blockchain Solutions,
the current supply chain system is inefficient as it relies on the physical movement
of a huge number of paper documents “for shipping transactions.” 7 This system
is “very vulnerable to fraud, human error and inadvertent delays.” 8 Wolfgang
Lehmacher, the Head of Supply Chain and Transport Industries at the World
Economic Forum, sees blockchain and smart contracts as the solution to these
transaction costs because of the potential of the technology to make payments
and collaboration between traders easier and more transparent. 9 Emmanuelle
Ganne, former counselor to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Director1

Blockchain is the most well-known type of electronic records system that enables multiple
participants to “collectively create, maintain, and update a shared set of authoritative records (the
‘ledger’).” See MICHAEL RAUCHS ET AL., CAMBRIDGE CENTRE FOR ALT. FIN., DISTRIBUTED LEDGER
TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 24 (2018), http://perma.cc/W4N6-TW5J;
Most of today’s smart contracts are based on or tied to blockchain technology. See Scott A.
McKinney et al., Smart Contracts, Blockchain, and the Next Frontier of Transactional Law, 13 WASH. J. L.
TECH. & ARTS 313 (2018).

2

Stuart D. Levi & Alex B. Lipton, An Introduction to Smart Contracts and Their Potential and Inherent
Limitations, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL
REGULATION (May 26, 2018), http://perma.cc/UM6E-8WU8.
See Chelsea Chan, The Power and Pitfalls of Smart Contracts: A Recap, LAWTECH.ASIA (Apr. 24, 2018),
http://perma.cc/LRQ6-57LQ.
Charlotte R. Young, A Lawyer's Divorce: Will Decentralized Ledgers and Smart Contracts Succeed in Cutting
Out the Middleman, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 649 (2018).
See, for example, Ian Allison, 94 Companies Join IBM and Maersk's Blockchain Supply Chain, COINDESK
(Aug. 9, 2018), http://perma.cc/9B6W-W8ST; see also Sumeet Chatterjee, HSBC Says Performs First
Trade Finance Deal Using Single Blockchain System, REUTERS (May 14, 2018), http://perma.cc/7JZWP65K.
See Allison, supra note 5; Chatterjee, supra note 5.

3

4

5

6
7

Lisa Froelings, Blockchain Technology Can Accelerate International Trade Flows, Say Industry Experts,
COINTELEGRAPH (Nov. 19, 2017), http://perma.cc/PV68-PHVX.

8

Id.
See id.

9
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General, published a full report in a WTO publication on the power of blockchain
and smart contracts to revolutionize international trade. 10
Of course, a lot of the talk about the benefits of blockchain and cross-border
smart contracts may just be hype created by an increasing number of startups in
the blockchain industry. As one industry insider noted, all the promising benefits
of smart contracts for international trade will take time “because the existing
financial infrastructure has been in place for decades and because it is hard to get
competing institutions to cooperate.” 11 But the legal and business industries have
responded to the hype in hopes of benefitting from its promise. For example,
IBM and Maersk have made joint investments to deliver blockchain to the
shopping industry (although they are currently struggling to sign up carriers as the
unprecedented nature of the blockchain venture leaves many businesses
hesitant). 12 In addition, LegalZoom has partnered with a blockchain company to
use smart contracts to compose its legal documents, ranging from wills and trusts
to trademarks and copyrights. 13
However, the use of smart contracts for business agreements has raised
important questions concerning their legal validity that currently do not have a
direct answer in available case law or in relevant international legal texts. There
are many different types of smart contracts, which lie on a spectrum of
possibilities. 14 On one end of the spectrum is a smart contract that has a code that
includes all of the terms of a contract, and a “running program referring to that
code is a complete contract undergoing performance.” 15 On the other end is a
smart contract that simply digitizes simple performances such as payment and
operates together with the terms of an associated traditional paper contract.
Given the broad range of possibilities for what a smart contract can be, questions
arise as to exactly when along the spectrum a smart contract becomes legally
binding. 16 This question often turns on the applicable law determining the issue
and the factual circumstances of the case.

10

See EMMANUELLE GANNE, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, CAN BLOCKCHAIN REVOLUTIONIZE
INTERNATIONAL TRADE? (2018) http://perma.cc/P9FY-AF8D.

11

Rebecca Liao, How Blockchain Could Shape International Trade, FOREIGN AFF. (Aug. 16, 2017),
http://perma.cc/F34C-R4R8.

12

See Anujit Kumar Mukhopadhyay, Maersk and IBM Team up to Deliver Blockchain to the Shipping Industry,
BLOCKTELEGRAPH (Oct. 14, 2018), http://perma.cc/ZU5S-KY9X.

13

Mike Dalton, LegalZoom Will Use Smart Contracts In Legal Documents, UNHASHED (Sept. 18, 2018),
http://perma.cc/BDP8-EGHU.

14

R3 & NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT LLP, CAN SMART CONTRACTS BE LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACTS?
13 (2016) http://perma.cc/KP7M-FEBM.

15

Id.
See id.

16
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I focus on the U.S. legal context for smart contracts in international trade.
Although it does not directly address the formation of smart contracts in
international trade, the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods (CISG or the Convention) generally governs the formation of many
international contracts for goods by international traders whose countries have
also adopted the Convention. 17 The Model Law on Electronic Commerce
(MLEC), which governs electronic communications in international trade, also
applies to smart contracts and was adopted by the U.S. in 1999. 18 However, model
laws are not considered binding at an international level, so I mainly analyze smart
contracts under the CISG, which previous scholars have ignored. 19
Thus, in this Comment, I seek to fill in the interpretational gap for the
CISG’s applicability to smart contracts in an attempt to reduce the legal
uncertainty and confusion that surround smart contracts. The value of U.S.
international trade is trillions of dollars, and many developing countries depend
on trade with the U.S. 20 But without an international legal framework, legal
ambiguities surrounding smart contracts may discourage entrepreneurs from
developing this technology and thereby deter increasing trade flows and enhancing
trade efficiency. 21
Thus, due to the ambiguity of smart contract use and the possibilities of a
breach, it is important to discuss what exactly the CISG has to say about smart
contracts. Moreover, smart contracts may help reduce the transaction costs of
international trade and thereby promote it.
In this Comment, I argue that smart contracts can, like traditional contracts,
meet the contract formation requirements of the Convention’s provisions and
thus are valid under the CISG. I also argue that smart contracts are consistent with
the principles and goals underlying the creation of the CISG. Section II introduces
the current technology of smart contracts and how it can be used for international
sales agreements. Section III lays out the provisions of the CISG as well as
examining the issue of validity in Article 4 of the Convention. In Section IV, I
analyze the validity of smart contracts under the provisions laid out in Section III.

17

18

19

20

21

See Albert H. Kritzer, The Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Scope, Interpretation
and Resources, CORNELL REV. CONVENTION ON CONT. FOR INT’L SALE GOODS 147 (1995),
http://perma.cc/W4ZW-7278.
See Aaheree Mukherjee, Smart Contracts—Another Feather in UNCITRAL’s Cap, CORNELL INT’L L.J.
ONLINE (2018), http://perma.cc/52Z5-DPGY.
See José Angelo Estrella Faria, UNCITRAL: Model Laws as Tools for Legal Harmonization,
http://perma.cc/7RE3-7W8R.
See Total Value of U.S. International Trade from 2000 to 2016 (in billion U.S. dollars), STATISTA (2018),
http://perma.cc/8CLG-TKTE.
See R3 & NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT LLP, supra note 14.
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II. S MART C ONTRACTS : A B REAKDOWN
A. Definitions and Existing Framework
The term “smart contract”—first proposed by Nick Szabo—refers to “a set
of promises, specified in digital form, including protocols within which the parties
perform on these promises.” 22 Simply put, a smart contract is a software program
that can “automatically execute, verify and enforce the performance” of
transactions (such as releasing payment), which are triggered by events (receipt of
goods). 23 These events are pre-defined by its software code written in
programming languages, such as Solidity. 24 When the transactions constitute
fulfillment of a “set of promises” agreed upon by the parties, there may be a legally
enforceable contract. 25 Moreover, smart contracts are distinguished from
electronic contracts because the “actual agreement is automated and embodied in
computer code, rather than in words.” 26 Because smart contracts are automated
programs, a transaction under a smart contract, once initiated and all conditions
are met, is typically unstoppable by any party to the smart contract. 27 While this
immediate and unstoppable execution may reduce transaction costs, an
“emergency exit” has been recently developed that can stop the execution of a
smart contract once triggered. 28
The automated and contractual aspects of a smart contract are often
compared to that of a vending machine. For example, the typical vending machine
follows an “if . . . then” code, with the following terms: if you put the required
amount of money in the machine and press the button(s) associated with a Dr
Pepper, then the underlying code in the machine will ensure that, after checking

22

Nick Szabo, Smart Contracts: Building Blocks for Digital Markets, EXTROPY (1996) (partial rewrite),
http://perma.cc/ZZ49-PBFK.

23

Jeffrey Neuburger, The Cross-Industry Promise of Blockchain, NEW MEDIA AND TECHNOLOGY LAW
BLOG (Mar. 15, 2017), http://perma.cc/K76E-LAZ6. See also Megan Frydel, How to Use Ethereum
Smart Contracts, BITEMYCOIN (Sept. 21, 2018), http://perma.cc/F88N-JEYF.
See Virginia Cram-Martos, UN/CEFACT Project Leader and Domain Coordinator for Int’l Trade
Procedures, Address at the UNCTAD eCommerce Week (Apr. 20, 2018),; see also Ethereum,
Introduction to Smart Contracts, SOLIDITY (2016-2018), http://perma.cc/G5WS-2LZC.

24

25

26

Richard Holden & Anup Malani, Can Blockchain Solve the Holdup Problem in Contracts? 15 (U. of Chi.
Coase-Sandor Inst. For L. & Econ. Research Working Paper No. 846, 2018); see also Josh Stark,
Making Sense of Blockchain Smart Contracts, COINDESK (June 7, 2016), http://perma.cc/M2XV-JVLT.
Mukherjee, supra note 18.

27

Philipp Paech, Law and Autonomous Systems Series: What is a Smart Contract, OXFORD BUSINESS LAW
BLOG (July 9, 2018), http://perma.cc/NBD4-4URY.

28

Controlling Autonomy: A New Tool to Stop Smart Contracts Once Executed, CONSENSYS MEDIA (Aug. 8,
2018), http://perma.cc/2LKW-KHW8.
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that the money is valid and sufficient, you get your Dr Pepper. 29 Moreover, the
machine will deliver the drink without the need of an intermediary to doublecheck or execute the transaction. 30 It is this ability to perform transactions
independently that makes the contract “smart.”
Blockchain-based smart contracts involve more than just the “if . . . then”
code found in vending machines. As defined by the European Central Bank
(ECB), a blockchain is a digital “ledger (book of records) of all transactions,”
which are organized and combined in “blocks” that are “chained” or linked
together on a decentralized database. 31 This digital record is shared or distributed
instantaneously across a network of participating users, also known as “nodes,”
and every transaction that is recorded by blockchain is transparent to these
users—making transparency an important feature of blockchain. 32 This
distributed ledger can also be permissioned and private, meaning that the
membership of users who can view and participate in a particular distributed
ledger can be restricted, as opposed to permissionless and public ledgers that are
open to everyone. 33 Moreover, there is only one source of accurate data (known
as the “golden” version); because blockchain uses a consensus technique that
ensures that every participating user agrees on the record, there are no “multiple
competing sets of records.” 34
Blockchains have a neutral and immutable aspect in the sense that in order
for anyone to make any change to past digital records, a “vast majority of users in
the network would need to agree on the change and be willing to spend resources
to update all subsequent blocks of the chain.” 35 Because such changes involve a
lot of time and money, require a majority consensus, and are immediately
transparent to all participants in the ledger, once a transaction is recorded by the
blockchain, it is often considered irreversible or “locked in.” 36 This permanency
feature explains why blockchain is sometimes described as a “digital stone,”
29

Nik Custodio, Smart Contracts
http://perma.cc/J5YD-2UAG.

30

Kevin T. McCarthy, Unanswered Legal Issues: Blockchain “Smart Contracts,” FOR THE DEFENSE 14 (Mar.
2018), http://perma.cc/8LHV-D8B4.

31

EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES –
http://perma.cc/JN7K-L6K3.

32

INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASSN. & LINKLATERS, SMART CONTRACTS AND DISTRIBUTED LEDGER
– A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 7 (2017), http://perma.cc/KC6H-GDWG.

33

See id. at 8.
Id. at 7.

34

for

Dummies,

FREECODECAMP

A

(May

26,

2017),

FURTHER ANALYSIS 33 (2015),

35

Jay Chang, Blockchain: The Immutable Ledger of Transparency in Healthcare Technology, MEDIUM (Aug. 23,
2017), http://perma.cc/7NWQ-DENZ.

36

Christian Shearer, Building a Network of Trust using Blockchain Technology, MEDIUM (Feb. 1, 2018),
http://perma.cc/5P6U-ZSL9.
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referring to the way that carvings on stone are physically permanent. 37 The
irrevocability, neutrality, and transparency of blockchain contribute to the
widespread trust in the integrity of its ledgers and decrease opportunities for
fraud. 38 This integrity is maintained by the structure of blockchain technology,
which acts “independent[ly] of intermediaries and third-party guarantors.” 39
Because the code of smart contracts is embedded in blockchain, the code of
a smart contract and each transaction that occurs under it are supposed to carry
all of blockchain’s characteristics of immutability, neutrality, and transparency. 40
There is only one “golden” version of the code that is locked in and transparent
to all. 41 The agreed terms of the smart contract apply to all participating users,
irrespective of their real world position or authority. 42
To give an idea of what a typical smart contract looks like in action, consider
the following example:
[S]ay that Company A agrees to purchase 500 widgets from Company B. The
parties then translate this agreement into blockchain coding. The block of
coding states, “if Company B delivers 500 widgets to Company A by
December 1, 2017, at 5:00 PM ESD, then Company A delivers $10,000 USD
to Company B.” The blockchain can then be linked to sources known as
“oracles.” An oracle is an outside source that provides information to the
blockchain smart contract . . . In our hypothetical smart contract . . .the
oracles would be Company A’s computerized delivery database and the two
companies’ bank accounts. Once Company B’s delivery of 500 widgets is
confirmed in Company A’s system, the blockchain will automatically trigger
Company A’s bank account to transfer $10,000 to Company B’s bank account
without any required action by the parties or any verification by a third-party
clearinghouse. 43

As is demonstrated by this example, the first step in a smart contract is often
the agreement between the two parties, which the software code will be based on.
This agreement should include set conditions that establish what events will
trigger a particular transaction. The next step is related to cryptography, or the
“practice of secure communication,” aimed at preventing third parties from

37
38

39

40

Custodio, supra note 29.
See Eric Piscini et al., Blockchain: Democratized Trust, in TECH TRENDS 2016: INNOVATING IN THE
DIGITAL ERA 80–95 (2016), http://perma.cc/4Y79-2B3B.
Muhammad Raza, What Are Smart Contracts and How Are Enterprises Using Them?, BMCBLOGS (July
31, 2018), http://perma.cc/8HMJ-RH4L.
See ISDA & LINKLATERS, supra note 32.

41

USAVE, The Golden Blockchain: Building Trust in the Gold Ecosystem, MEDIUM (Aug. 24, 2018),
http://perma.cc/4GGA-AZXZ.

42

See Raza, supra note 39.
McCarthy, supra note 30.

43
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reading the content of the communication. 44 If a participant wants to initiate a
transaction or send a message to the other participant(s), he or she must authorize
the transaction before it is automatically enforced. 45 Blockchain uses public key
encryption infrastructure (PKI) for authorization, which relies on two keys: the
public key, which is derived from a participant’s account address, and the private
key, which acts as a participant’s electronic signature. 46 Every participant has a
unique key that he or she uses to “initiate transactions on that distributed ledger,”
which is then checked against a “signing authority list” stored in the digital
ledger. 47 Participants can use the public key to “verify that the smart contract
transaction was initiated by the initiator in possession of the private key and to
authenticate the message contents.” 48 This authentication system does away with
the need for third-party verification systems. Once the transaction is authenticated
and the code is executed, the digital ledgers are updated to reflect the performance
of the transaction. Finally, it is very important that the oracles, whose role is to
“feed information from the outside world into the ledger to facilitate smart
contract enforcement,” are a trustworthy third party that can transmit “accurate
and trustworthy data in a secure manner.” 49

B. Broad Range of Smart Contracts
Of course, the above example is by no means the only manner in which a
smart contract may be executed. There are many different types of transactions a
smart contract can perform, as well as many different types of smart contracts.
Smart contracts lie on a broad spectrum of possibilities. 50 On one end of the
spectrum is a smart contract with a code that “constitutes the entirety of the terms
of a contract, and a running program referring to that code is a complete contract
undergoing performance.” 51 These type of smart contracts are meant to “model
commercial relationships” for simple transactions such as automatic payments or

44

45

46
47
48

49
50
51

Bisade Asolo, Blockchain Public Key & Private Key Explained, MYCRYPTOPEDIA (Nov. 1, 2018),
http://perma.cc/6QME-KDRR.
BITFURY GROUP LIMITED, PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE BLOCKCHAINS PART 1: PERMISSIONED
BLOCKCHAINS (2015), http://perma.cc/XV92-QL48.
INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N & LINKLATERS, supra note 32, at 21.
See id.
SMART CONTRACTS ALLIANCE & DELOITTE, CHAMBER OF DIGITAL COMMERCE SMART
CONTRACTS: 12 USE CASES FOR BUSINESS & BEYOND 44 (2016), http://perma.cc/9B8J-FW2M
See id.
R3 & NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT LLP, supra note 14.
See id. at 13.
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asset transfers. 52 On the other end is a smart contract that simply digitizes simple
performances such as payment and operates in conjunction with the terms of an
associated written contract. 53 Somewhere in between is a ‘split’ smart contract
model under which “non-human performance is encoded into computer code,
and wider human obligations, remedial and other provisions are written into
natural language, the two components operating together as a cohesive
contract.” 54
In addition to the existence of many types of smart contracts, there is also a
large range of possibilities for the type of contractual clauses that will be
incorporated into the agreements. However, not all clauses can be automated or
subject to self-execution, so some may be more suitable to automation in smart
contracts than others. Such clauses are called “operational clauses,” which
“generally embed some form of conditional logic,” and include:
A clause that requires an amount to be payable on a payment date equal to
the product of a calculation amount, a floating rate (plus or minus a spread)
and a day count fraction; [a] clause that requires an amount to be payable on
an exercise date equal to the number of options exercised multiplied by a
strike price differential; [a] clause that provides that one party to the contract
pays the other an amount equal to the difference between the settlement price
and a forward price, with the party required to make such payment being
determined by whether the settlement price exceeds the forward price or vice
versa; and a clause that requires a party to transfer assets on a particular date
that have a value equal to the amount by which a required credit support
amount is less than the value of collateral provided, subject to certain
formulaic haircuts and adjustments. 55

These clauses embed conditional logic in the sense that a specified time or
event will trigger or require a corresponding action. 56 On the other hand, nonoperational clauses do not embed conditional logic and “relate to the wider legal
relationship between the parties.” This includes examples such as dispute
resolution clauses or choice of law clauses, a statement to the effect that that “a
party’s obligations under the legal agreement constitute legal, valid and binding
obligations,” and representations in relation to acting in good faith and acting in
a “commercially reasonable manner.” 57

52

53
54
55
56
57

CARDOZO BLOCKCHAIN PROJECT, “SMART CONTRACTS” & LEGAL ENFORCEABILITY 4 (2018),
http://perma.cc/NW8C-XJXV.
See id.
R3 & NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT LLP, supra note 14, at 13.
INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N & LINKLATERS, supra note 32, at 10.
Id.
Id. at 11.
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Finally, given the broad range of smart contracts and the different types of
agreements that can be embedded therein, questions have arisen as to exactly
when along the spectrum is a smart contract considered valid and binding. 58 This
question often turns on the applicable law determining the issue and the factual
circumstances of the case. Thus, in Section III we turn to exploring the default
applicable law for international sales contracts of commercial goods between
signatory countries: the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods (CISG).

C. Hacks and Emergency Stops
The “DAO Hack” is the most famous example of a successful hack of a
smart contract. 59 The DAO, a venture capital fund that operated through smart
contracts, raised over $150 million in digital coins that it stored in smart contracts
with investors who could collectively vote on how these funds would be spent. 60
However, a hacker managed to steal the equivalent of $79.6 million in digital
currency by exploiting a “bug” 61 in the programming code underlying the smart
contracts. 62 The smart contract’s irreversible nature made it hard for programmers
to stop the hacker’s attack. 63 Even heavily tested codes may contain bugs that are
not known until a hacker’s attack reveals it. 64
To minimize the risks of hacking, computer programmers have developed
an “emergency stop” or a “circuit breaker,” which halts the execution of the smart
contract if a bug is discovered or in the case of a security emergency such as a
hack. 65 The ability to implement an emergency stop is incorporated into the smart
contract’s code and can be triggered by pre-authorized participants of the smart
contract. 66 However, triggering emergency stops are not costless because

58

R3 & NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT LLP, supra note 14.

59

Samuel Falkon, The Story of the DAO — Its History and Consequences, MEDIUM (Dec. 24, 2017),
http://perma.cc/98RT-ADXA.

60

Joon Ian Wong, A $79 Million Cryptocurrency Heist Just Happened, and It’s Threatening the Future of
Blockchains, QUARTZ (June 17, 2016), http://perma.cc/CJ7U-76Q9.

61

A bug is a technical flaw in a smart contract’s programming code that creates a loophole for a hacker
to exploit. See RAUCHS, supra note 1.

62

See Falkon, supra note 59.
See id.

63
64
65

66

See Emergency Stop, SOLIDITY-PATTERNS (2018), http://perma.cc/NL6H-7R6C.
See Maximilian Wöhrer & Uwe Zdun, Smart Contracts: Security Patterns in the Ethereum Ecosystem and
Solidity, INST. ELEC. & ELEC. ENG’R 5 (2018), http://perma.cc/MZ9A-KFZ7.
See id.
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executing transactions on blockchain costs money and parties may choose to
spend extra time and money to upgrade the contract to remove the bug. 67

III. U.N. C ONVENTION ON C ONTRACTS FOR THE
I NTERNATIONAL S ALE OF G OODS (CISG)
International trade transactions involve multiple actors and complex
processes and require the submission of a multitude of paper documents. 68 For
example, the typical international trade transaction involves processes related to
customs and border procedures, commercial transactions, and trade financing,
including a host of documents related to each of those processes. 69 Moreover,
trade finance is usually a labor-intensive process, with the average transaction
involving more than twenty people. 70 The paper- and labor-intensive process of
international trade increases administrative costs and are “prone to error, losses
and fraud.” 71 As a result, a number of logistics and transportation companies as
well as governments have started to investigate how blockchain and digitalizing
trade “could be used to cut paperwork and enhance processes involved in the
export of goods.” 72 For example, Maersk, a leading player in the transport and
logistics industry, has been working actively with IBM to develop a blockchainbased trade platform, which involves the “the automation of various business
processes such as import and export clearance via smart contracts.” 73 The goal of
this platform is to cut costs by reducing the need for bank intermediaries by
automatizing money transfers between parties’ bank accounts and reducing the
exchange of paper documents as information will be digitized and available to all
the players involved in the trade transaction. 74
Since smart contract technology is still being developed and has yet to be
tested on a wide-scale, global trade basis, its level of efficiency remains uncertain.
67

68
69
70

71
72
73
74

See Gideon Greenspan, Smart Contracts: The Good, the Bad and the Lazy, MULTICHAIN (Nov. 2, 2015),
http://perma.cc/466C-GL8Q; see also Danny Ryan, Costs of a Real World Ethereum Contract,
HACKERNOON.COM (Aug. 10, 2017), http://perma.cc/HW4N-3HJY.
GANNE, supra note 10.
See id.
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 2018 GLOBAL TRADE – SECURING FUTURE GROWTH
(2018), http://perma.cc/4XLC-SUBZ.
Ganne, supra note 10, at 19.
See id.
See id. at 42.
See Michael del Castillo, IBM-Maersk Blockchain Platform Adds 92 Clients As Part Of Global Launch,
FORBES (Aug. 9, 2018), http://perma.cc/QN57-77HF; see also Michael White, Digitizing Global Trade
with Maersk and IBM, BLOCKCHAIN PULSE: IBM BLOCKCHAIN BLOG (Jan. 16, 2018),
http://perma.cc/DQV2-WF54.
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Additionally, and importantly, the legal status of smart contracts also remains
contested.
However, the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(CISG) is the default rule with respect to most international sales contracts
between CISG-signatory parties, it is therefore worth exploring what the CISG
has to say about the legality of smart contracts.

A. Background of the CISG
The U.N. Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)—a
commission that was created to promote the harmonization of international trade
law—developed the text of the CISG, which was later adopted by sixty-two
countries, including the U.S., at the Vienna Convention in 1980. 75 The U.S. ratified
the CISG in 1986, and the CISG continues to be federal law today. 76 The CISG
also remains the default contract law in “seventy-eight other countries, known as
‘Contracting States’ to the Convention,” including the Republic of Korea, China,
Mexico, Switzerland, and Italy. 77
As a result of the U.S. ratification of the CISG, the CISG is the default
contract law for contracts between the U.S. and other Contracting States and is
federal law that “preempts all conflicting state law.” 78 Of course, under Article 6,
parties may “exclude the application of this Convention or . . . derogate from or
vary the effect of any of its provisions.” 79 However, unless the parties expressly
waive or opt out of the application of the CISG, most courts will hold that the
CISG applies to the contract for the sale of international goods if the parties are
from different States that have ratified the CISG or the parties included the CISG
in the choice of law clause of the contract. Moreover, the failure to negotiate out
or to select the CISG as a choice of law in the contract may have unfavorable
consequences for one or both of the parties. For example, in Filanto, S.p.A v.
Chilewich International Corp, 80 the plaintiff unexpectedly found out that his contract
was subject to the provisions of the CISG. He was ultimately barred from
75

76

77
78
79
80

See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods art. 7, Apr. 11,
1980, 14 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG], http://perma.cc/AH4F-XVYP; see also Kina Grbic,
Comment, Putting the CISG Where It Belongs: In the Uniform Commercial Code, 29 TOURO L. REV. 173,
176 (2012–2013).
Grbic, supra note 75; Thomas J. Drago & Alan F. Zoccolillo, Be Explicit: Drafting Choice of Law Clauses
in International Sale of Goods Contracts, METRO. CORP. COUNS. 9 (May 2002), http://perma.cc/U9E8LXKZ.
Grbic, supra note 75.
See id.
CISG, supra note 75, at art. 6.
Filanto, S.p.A v. Chilewich Int'l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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initiating a breach of contract suit that would not have happened had he expressly
opted out of the CISG’s terms. 81 In the context of U.S. law, if the parties exclude
the CISG, then the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) governs certain contracts
for the sale of goods. 82
The CISG was created with two goals in mind: 1) to ensure legal certainty
and 2) to promote international trade. 83 It aims to achieve these two goals by
promoting uniformity in its application, meaning that the interpretation of its
provisions should not be “influenced by the concepts used in the legal system of
the country of the forum.” 84 This autonomous style of interpretation will ideally
avoid the legal uncertainty of applying a particular national law that one party may
be unfamiliar with. 85 This clarity in turn will promote international trade, as parties
will in theory have an incentive to contract and trade because the CISG, unlike
national laws, “does not favor any party to the transaction that it governs,”
especially because it “combines both common law and civil law elements.” 86 As
the CISG states in its Preamble, “the adoption of uniform rules which govern
contracts for the international sale of goods and take into account the different
social, economic and legal systems would contribute to the removal of legal
barriers in international trade and promote the development of international
trade.” 87
Moreover, the CISG “reflects compromises between common-law and civillaw traditions as well as between developing and developed and controlled
economy and free-economy countries. It incorporates these compromises in order
to facilitate subsequent adoptions of the Convention throughout the world and to

81

See Asante Techs., Inc. v. PMC-Sierra, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (N.D. Cal. 2001).

82

See Jennifer E. Hill, The Future of Electronic Contracts in International Sales: Gaps and Natural Remedies
under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 2 NW. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 1, 14 (2003).
See id.

83
84

85
86
87

See CISG, supra note 75, at art. 7., which states that:
In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its international
character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the
observance of good faith in international trade. Questions concerning matters
governed by this Convention which are not expressly settled in it are to be
settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is based or, in the
absence of such principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of
the rules of private international law.
See also UNCITRAL, The UNCITRAL Digest of Case Law on the United Nations Convention on
the International Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.9/SER.C/DIGEST/CISG/7 (June 8,
2004).
Grbic, supra note 75, at 178.
See id.
CISG, supra note 75, at Preamble.
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make it more useful in meeting varying needs of ratifying states.” 88 In the context
of international trade, industrialized countries continue to have more bargaining
power than developing countries, and UNCITRAL sought to provide a neutral
set of laws that developing countries (which also helped to draft the Convention)
would approve of and adopt. 89 As explained by UNCITRAL, small and mediumsized companies located in developing countries often do not have access to a
lawyer when negotiating a contract. 90 Because these companies “may also be the
weaker contractual parties and could have difficulties in ensuring that the
contractual balance is kept,” the aim of the CISG was to level the playing field in
contractual law by creating a “fair and uniform regime.” 91
Finally, the CISG is divided into three parts: Part I introduces the scope of
application and general provisions, Part II describes the formation of a contract,
and Part III describes more detailed rules for issues that often arise in
contracting. 92

B. The Broad Scope of the CISG’s Provisions
This Subsection focuses mostly on the provisions of the CISG from Section
II (Art. 14-24), but also includes some discussion on articles in Section I and
Section III, to show the rules covering contract formation by means of offer and
acceptance. The CISG’s provisions regarding offer and acceptance is especially
critical to the analysis below that smart contracts can be valid under the CISG.

1. To constitute at offer, a proposal should be sufficiently definite,
indicate intention to be bound, and be addressed to at least one
person.
Article 4 broadly defines the two main areas of contract law that the CISG
covers: “the formation of the contract of sale and the rights and obligations of the
seller and the buyer arising from such a contract.” 93 This Comment mainly focuses
on the formation of the contract as it more directly relates to the validity of a
contract. To understand contract formation under the CISG, one must start with

88

Louis F. Del Duca & Patrick Del Duca, Practice Under the Convention on International Sale of Goods
(CISG): A Primer for Attorneys and International Traders, 27 UNIFORM COM. CODE L.J. 331 (1995), 29
UNIFORM COM. CODE L.J. 99 (1996), http://perma.cc/C4RG-XBF9.

89

Uche Anyamele, The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: A Proposal
for Nigeria, IICL PACE LAW CISG DATABASE (2011), http://perma.cc/3Q6S-97K4.

90

CISG, supra note 75.
See id.

91
92
93

See Hill, supra note 82.
CISG, supra note 75, at art. 4.

Summer 2019

155

Chicago Journal of International Law

Article 14, which introduces the requirements of offer and acceptance for the
formation of a contract.
Under Article 14 of the CISG, a “proposal for concluding a contract”
constitutes an offer if: 1) there is an offer addressed to at least one specific person;
2) the offeror has indicated an intention to be bound in the event of acceptance;
and 3) the offer is sufficiently definite because it indicates the goods and expressly
or implicitly makes provisions for determining quantity and price. 94 If the proposal
addresses an indefinite group of people, then Article 14 requires “a clear indication
of whether it is an offer.” 95 Otherwise, the proposal will be treated as merely an
invitation to make an offer. With respect to the sufficient definiteness
requirement, Article 14 allows the offeror to “implicitly fix[] or make[] provisions
for determining the price.” An offeror’s communication may be an “offer” even
if it referred to the price as being listed in a catalog if there had been prior course
of dealings or the usage of trade recognizes the price as being set out in the
catalog. 96
Finally, there is also a subjective element to the formation of contracts under
Article 14 of the CISG, as it requires some manifestation of the readiness of the
offeror to be bound by the offer in case of an acceptance. Article 8 explains how
this intent can be shown:
[S]tatements made by and other conduct of a party are to be interpreted
according to the understanding that a reasonable person of the same kind as
the other party would have had in the same circumstances. In determining
the intent of a party or the understanding a reasonable person would have
had, due consideration is to be given to all relevant circumstances of the case
including the negotiations, any practices which the parties have established
between themselves, usages and any subsequent conduct of the parties. 97

According to Article 8, the offeror’s intent to be bound can be proven by all
the relevant extrinsic evidence outside of the four corners of the document, even
taking into account the statements and the conduct of the parties both during
negotiations leading up to formation of the contract as well as after the contract
94
95
96

97

CISG, supra note 75, at art. 14.
Belkıs Vural, Formation of Contract According to the CISG, 6 ANKARA B. REV. 125, 130 (2013).
Peter Winship, Formation of International Sales Contracts under the 1980 Vienna Convention, 17 INT’L. LAW.
1, 6 (1983); see also CISG, supra note 75 at art. 9, which states:
This use of prior dealings and trade custom is also made possible by Article 9,
which states: (1) The parties are bound by any usage to which they have agreed
and by any practices which they have established between themselves. (2) The
parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to have impliedly made
applicable to their contract or its formation a usage of which the parties knew
or ought to have known and which in international trade is widely known to,
and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved in the
particular trade concerned.”
CISG, supra note 75, at art. 8.
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is alleged to have been performed. In addition, the parties’ intent to be bound can
also be shown by usages and practices that parties have established between
themselves or that are regularly observed in their particular industry. 98 But in
circumstances where there are no indications of the parties’ intent, the court or
arbitrator should “apply the objective criterion of an understanding that a
reasonable person would attribute to the statements and conduct of the party, i.e.,
to the contract, in the equivalent circumstances.” 99 Moreover, while the
fundamental elements (goods, quantity, and price) of the contract under Article
14 must be determined in the offer for the offer to be “sufficiently definite,” nonfundamental elements under Article 8 can be “derived from the parties’ statements
and behavior, or determined by a court, arbitrator or third person.” 100
Finally, under Article 15 of the CISG, “[a]n offer becomes effective when it
reaches the offeree.” 101 In the context of electronic communications, the term
“reaches” in Article 15 “corresponds to the point in time when an electronic
communication has entered the offeree's server.” 102

2. To constitute an acceptance, the offeree’s statement or conduct
should indicate assent to the offer.
Under Article 18 of the CISG, an offeree’s acceptance is “[a] statement made
by or other conduct of the offeree indicating assent to an offer.” 103 Therefore,
absolute silence or the offeree’s failure to follow up on an earlier expression of
interest does not count as acceptance. 104 Moreover, an acceptance becomes
effective “the moment the indication of assent reaches the offeror . . . within the
time [the offeror] has fixed or, if no time is fixed, within a reasonable time” and

98

Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL Secretariat on the United Nations Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc. V.89–53886 (June 1989), http://perma.cc/8JX8X34Y.

99

Article 8: Interpretation of Party's Statements or other Conduct, IICL PACE LAW CISG DATABASE (2009),
http://perma.cc/WV8A-NE5G.

100

Guide to Article 14: Comparison with Principles of European Contract Law (PECL), IICL PACE LAW CISG
DATABASE (2007), http://perma.cc/4VT4-P8AE.

101

CISG, supra note 75, at art. 15.
CISG-Advisory Council Opinion no 1: Electronic Communications under CISG, IICL PACE LAW CISG
DATABASE (2006), http://perma.cc/9YXE-Q6JX. The CISG Advisory Council (The CISG-AC) is
an entity composed of an independent group of experts that was founded in 2001 by Professor
Albert Kritzer of the Institute of International Commercial Law. The primary purpose of the CISGAC is to “issue opinions relating to the interpretation and application of the Convention on request
or on its own initiative.”
CISG, supra note 75, at art. 18.

102

103
104

Legislative History 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference: Summary Records of Meetings of the First Committee,
IICL PACE LAW CISG DATABASE (2014), http://perma.cc/D5DP-LR8A.
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thus concludes the offer. 105 The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that the
offeror has the opportunity to learn of the offeree’s acceptance of his offer. 106 In
the context of electronic communication, an acceptance becomes effective when
“an electronic indication of assent has entered the offeror's server, provided that
the offeror has consented, expressly or impliedly, to receiving electronic
communications of that type, in that format, and to that address.” 107

3. An offeree’s acceptance is not subject to any form requirements and
may be proven by any means.
Under Article 11 of the CISG, oral agreements not evidenced by writing for
the sale of goods are still enforceable. As Article 11 states: “A contract of sale
need not be concluded in or evidenced by writing and is not subject to any other
requirement as to form. It may be proved by any means, including witnesses.” 108
Therefore, Article 11 does not contain any particular form requirements for the
formation of contracts or acceptances, meaning that the formation of contract
will be decided on the basis of the substance of the agreement rather than its
form. 109 Recognizing that some Contracting States have domestic laws that require
writing formalities for proving the existence of a contract, Article 96 of the CISG
allows countries to make a reservation to the applicability of Article 11’s
provisions. 110 However, even though U.S. contract law typically requires contracts
to be concluded in writing, the U.S. did not make a reservation to Article 11 under
Article 96. 111
Due to the lack of form requirements, we can also infer that a contract “may
be concluded or evidenced by electronic communications.” 112 Because the article
does not prescribe a particular form, the CISG also allows parties to conclude
their contracts electronically, even though “[t]he issue of electronic
communications beyond telegram and telex was not considered during the
drafting of the CISG in the 1970s.” 113 Moreover, under Article 13 of the CISG,
105

CISG, supra note 75, at art. 18(2).

106

CISG-Advisory Council, supra note 102.
See id.

107
108
109

CISG, supra note 75, at art. 11.
See id.

110

See Axel H. Baum, Checklist on the CISG, in GUIDE TO PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (Albert H.
Kritzer ed., 1994) (adapted excerpt), https://perma.cc/6ZE8-EETH. See also CISG, supra note 75,
at art. 96.

111

See Alicia Jurney, Who’s Afraid of the CISG?– Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, SMITH DEBNAM
ATTORNEYS AT LAW (July 8, 2008), http://perma.cc/NP7Y-Q6EV.

112

CISG-Advisory Council, supra note 102.
Id.
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the term “writing” includes telegram and telex. 114 Therefore, as a consequence of
Article 13, a contract may also be concluded or accepted by telegram and telex. 115
Article 13 shows how broad the CISG’s definition of “writing” is, which will be
important for the analysis below when considering whether smart contracts fall
within the Convention’s scope.

4. Unlike the U.C.C., the CISG does not have a parol evidence rule or
a perfect tender rule.
Under U.C.C. § 2-202, the parol evidence rule prohibits the introduction of
evidence outside of the “four corners” of a clear contract to prove the intent of
the parties that otherwise conflicts with the contract’s express terms. 116 Under
U.C.C. § 2-601, also known as the “perfect tender rule,” the buyer may reject the
goods if they do not conform precisely to the contract. 117 In contrast to the parol
evidence rule of the U.C.C., Article 8 of the CISG, as mentioned above, allows
the parties’ intentions to be bound by the contract to be proven by all the relevant
extrinsic evidence outside of a written contract. 118 Moreover, the CISG standard
of “substantial deprivation” for breach of contract is much lower than the perfect
tender rule. 119 Favoring performance, the CISG requires a fundamental breach of
the contract that would substantially deprive the parties of their entitlements
under the contract. 120 As a vaguer standard than the “perfect tender rule,” the
substantial deprivation rule of the CISG allows more flexibility for different
circumstances and makes it harder for the parties to breach. 121
Due to these differences between the CISG and the U.C.C., a smart contract
under the CISG is much more likely to be enforced. For example, in the event
that a smart contract under the CISG is hacked due to its faulty coding, it would
be easier for the parties to prove their intent to contract by pointing to other
circumstances, such as prior dealings or negotiations. 122 By contrast, if the faulty
smart contract code itself led to the breach, a party to a U.C.C.-governed smart
114
115

CISG, supra note 75, at art. 13.
CISG-Advisory Council, supra note 102.

116

See U.C.C. § 2-202 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977). See also The Parole Evidence Rule,
UNIV. N.M. JUD. EDUC. CTR., http://perma.cc/H3LM-WFCH.

117

See U.C.C. § 2-601 (Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n 1977); See also Aditi Ramesh, Petra Ghicu
& Cara Putman, CISG v. UCC: Key Distinctions and Applications, 7 BUS. & MGMT. REV. 459, 464 (June
2016).
See CISG, supra note 75, at art. 8.

118
119
120
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See id. at art. 25.
See id.
See Ramesh et al., supra note 117, at 465.
See CISG, supra note 75, at art. 8.
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contract would have a harder time showing its intent by simply referring to the
“four corners” of the code alone. 123 A party to this contract could argue that the
intention to be bound cannot be found in the code itself as it was intentionally
made vulnerable to hacking. Furthermore, in the event that a glitch or a hack of
the smart contract code leads to a less than optimal performance, it would be
much easier to back out of the contract under a perfect tender rule than under a
substantial deprivation rule.
In sum, under the Convention’s offer and acceptance requirements, broad
definition of writing, liberal evidence rules, and tendency toward enforcement, a
smart contract is likely to be considered valid under the Convention.

C. Limitations on the Scope of the CISG
The CISG only applies to contracts of the international sales of goods that
are between parties whose places of business are in different Contracting States.
124
The nationality of the parties to the contract in question is irrelevant when
deciding whether the places of business are in different states: only the location
of the parties’ places of business is taken into account in determining the
application of the CISG to the contract. 125 Moreover, the CISG generally applies
to contracts governing the commercial sale of goods, 126 but excludes coverage of
consumer sales and of “goods bought . . . by auction; on execution or otherwise
by authority of law; of stocks, shares, investment securities, negotiable instruments
or money; of ships, vessels, hovercraft or aircraft; of electricity.” 127
Article 4 of the CISG limits its applicability to the validity of the contract,
stating: “except as otherwise expressly provided in this Convention, it is not concerned with:
the validity of the contract or of any of its provisions or of any usage.” 128 Because
“validity” is not defined in Article 4 or in any of the CISG’s other provisions, it is

123

124
125
126

127
128

Under the revised Article 9 of the U.C.C., security interests are allowed to be created through
electronic records and signatures, suggesting an openness in the U.C.C. to electronic methods of
contracting. See Margo H. K. Tank et al., A Brief Guide to Using Electronic Signatures in Securities
Transactions, 6 PRAC. COMPLIANCE & RISK MGMT. SEC. INDUSTRY 23, 26 (2013),
http://perma.cc/2C5W-UZZ5; U.C.C. § 1-201 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) (in
which “writing” is defined as including “printing, typewriting, or any other intentional reduction to tangible
form”) (emphasis added).
See CISG, supra note 75, at art. 1.
See id.
See Fritz Enderlein & Dietrich Maskow, International Sales Law: United Nations Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods: Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods,
OCEANA PUBLICATIONS 28 (1992), http://perma.cc/6WVH-GZSE.
CISG, supra note 75, at art. 2.
Id. at art. 4 (emphasis added).
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left to the various domestic courts to determine the definition of validity. 129 As a
result of the ambiguity of Article 4, legal scholars and domestic courts of different
Contracting States have taken different approaches to interpreting the validity
question of Article 4. While some approve of a broad interpretation of Article 4,
arguing that issues of validity should only be determined by domestic law, others
apply a narrower interpretation, allowing the CISG’s provisions to displace
domestic law even on issues that in domestic law are usually considered relevant
to the validity of a contract. 130

1. Under a broad interpretation of Article 4, all issues of validity are
determined by domestic law.
One approach taken by scholars and courts is to simply disregard the CISG
on all matters regarding contract validity. Under this approach, validity is
“determined exclusively by domestic law.” 131 For example, in Geneva Pharmaceuticals
Tech. Corp. v. Barr Laboratories Inc., the Canadian defendant, who rejected a contract
with the plaintiff, argued that there was no breach of contract because there was
a lack of consideration. 132 Without looking at what the CISG had to say on the
issue of consideration, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York concluded that domestic law should govern this issue, stating that “[u]nder
the CISG, the validity of an alleged contract is decided under domestic law . . .
[b]y validity, the CISG refers to any issue by which the domestic law would render
the contract void, voidable, or unenforceable.” 133

2. Under the narrow “internationalist” interpretation of Article 4, legal
issues addressed by the CISG’s provisions are determined by the
CISG.
An alternative approach is to construe Article 4 of the CISG narrowly in
light of Article 7, the legislative intent of the CISG’s drafters, and the “except as
otherwise expressly provided” clause in Article 4(a). This Comment adopts this
approach for the analysis of smart contract validity under the CISG’s provisions.

129
130

See Ulrich Drobnig, Substantive Validity, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 635, 636 (1992).
See generally Ulrich G. Schroeter, The Validity of International Sales Contracts, in BOUNDARIES AND
INTERSECTIONS: THE 5TH ANNUAL MAA SCHLECHTRIEM CISG CONFERENCE 95 (Ingeborg
Schwenzer & Lisa Spagnolo eds., 2014).

131

Patrick C. Leyens, CISG and Mistake: Uniform Law vs. Domestic Law: The Interpretative Challenge of
Mistake and the Validity Loophole, in REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 2003–2004, 3 (Michael Maggi & Patrice Fraccio eds.,
2005), http://perma.cc/6GXG-9XT4.

132

Geneva Pharms. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 236, 283–84 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
Id. at 282.
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First, the legislative history of the CISG reveals that its drafters created
Article 4’s validity provision to be ambiguous to achieve a compromise so as to
avoid the postponement of reaching an agreement on the draft. At the same time,
however, the drafters “did not intend for the validity exception to provide carte
blanche for applying domestic public policy laws to international transactions.” 134
After all, the overarching purpose of the CISG was to promote uniformity in the
application of its laws. 135 The goal of uniformity, however, would be undermined
if courts can apply domestic rule of law in place of the CISG whenever they
determine that the issue in question concerns validity. 136 Moreover, Article 7 of
the CISG calls for a “detached characterisation of validity that is committed to the
unification purposes of the CISG.” Scholars under this narrow interpretive view
agree that this provision applies not only to the interpretation of the CISG’s rules
governing the formation of the contract but also to the scope of the CISG’s
application contained in Article 4. 137
Second, proponents of the narrower interpretation of Article 4 tend to
construe the “except as otherwise expressly provided in this Convention” clause
in Article 4(a) to refer to the preemption of domestic validity rules whenever an
issue is addressed or settled in the Convention through its provisions or general
principles. 138 This preemption may include issues considered pertaining to the
validity of a contract, such as the formation of a contract.
Given the underlying drafters’ intent of promoting uniformity in
interpretation and Article 7’s requirement for interpreting the CISG in light of this
goal, scholars and courts under this narrow view of Article 4 engage in an
“internationalist interpretation” of the CISG. 139 This interpretative approach
involves looking at the CISG first, without regard for the domestic law, to see
whether the facts and the legal issue(s) of the case come under the scope of and
are settled by the CISG. 140 If both criteria are met, then the “except as otherwise
expressly provided in the Convention” clause of Article 4 applies, and “the issue
is a non-validity one and domestic remedies are displaced” by the CISG. 141 For
example, because a form requirement for contracts is excluded by Article 11,
courts cannot apply domestic form requirements. Conversely, “for issues which
134

135
136
137
138
139
140
141

Nir Bar & Natanella Har-Sinay, Contract Validity and the CISG: Closing the Loophole § 3 (Jan. 19, 2008),
http://perma.cc/QFG3-WP6K.
See id.
See Schroeter, supra note 130, at 97, 104.
Leyens, supra note 131.
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See Schroeter, supra note 130, at 103.
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are not addressed by any provisions of the Convention, reference must be made
to domestic law.” 142
The preceding two Sections provided a general introduction to smart
contracts and a broad overview of the background and provisions of the CISG.
The following Section focuses especially on the Convention’s provisions
governing contract formation to show that some smart contracts are valid under
the CISG.

IV. A NALYSIS OF S MART C ONTRACTS U NDER THE CISG
Smart contracts on blockchain platforms are a relatively new technology and
there is a broad range of possibilities for what a smart contract can be. Because
UNCITRAL has yet to address whether the CISG applies to smart contracts, there
is uncertainty as to if and when, along a spectrum of possibilities, a smart contract
is a valid contract under the CISG. Smart contracts that are referenced by and
incorporated in a fully-developed written agreement are easier to analyze for
validity because the scrutiny can focus on the traditional contract elements of the
written agreement. Thus, this Comment focuses on the following question: In the
context of smart contract use for international trade transactions, can a smart
contract at the far end of the other side of the spectrum—the smart contract
whose code constitutes the entirety of the agreement—be a valid contract under
the CISG? This Comment argues that a smart contract whose code constitutes
the entirety of the agreement can be valid under the CISG because it can meet the
offer and acceptance requirements of the CISG.
For the sake of simplicity, the following analysis will be centered around a
hypothetical smart contract that contains the following agreement translated into
code: if Company B delivers one hundred electric motors to Company A by
December 23, 2018, at 5:00 PM (Central Time), then Company A delivers $1,000
USD to Company B. 143 In addition, this hypothetical smart contract falls within
the scope of the CISG under Article 1 and the parties have not indicated the
governing law of their contract. Furthermore, in the event of a dispute, the
contract is litigated in a U.S. court. 144
142

Bar, supra note 134, at 3.

143

This hypothetical is a modified version of the example provided in McCarthy, supra note 30, at 14.
I focus on the U.S. court system because—especially given the influence of American jurisprudence
and the fact that America is the world’s largest exporter and importer of many different goods—its
decisions will likely influence the way smart contracts are handled in the legal realm worldwide. See,
for example, A Look at How America Benefits from International Trade, NORWICH U. ONLINE (July 11,
2016), http://perma.cc/D2YG-F77U. See also, for example, THE LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE
IMPACT OF FOREIGN LAW ON DOMESTIC JUDGMENTS 28 (Mar. 2010), http://perma.cc/YC5KAKUR (“[f]oreign cases are commonly used in the domestic judgments of courts in England and
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In arguing that smart contracts are “valid” under the CISG, I define
“validity” in this Comment as “formation validity.” 145 In other words, as long as
the smart contract meets the contract formation requirements of the CISG, and
would not otherwise be void under domestic law on non-formation matters, then
that smart contract should be held as legally binding in a U.S. court.

A. Contract Validity under Article 4
Before discussing the validity of smart contracts under the CISG, it is
important to first resolve the ambiguity of contract validity created by Article 4.
In this Subsection, I will argue that the internationalist approach to Article 4,
which treats legal issues addressed by the CISG as being determined by its
provisions and not by domestic law, is the appropriate framework for analyzing
smart contract validity for contracts made under the circumstances laid out in the
hypothetical above.

1. The majority of scholars and judicial precedent favors the
internationalist approach to Article 4.
Because the hypothetical smart contract will be litigated in a U.S. court in
the event of a dispute, it is appropriate to consider how U.S. courts approach
Article 4’s validity clause. With the exception of Geneva Pharmaceuticals mentioned
in Section III, U.S. courts have tended to follow the approach of the majority of
scholars who favor the internationalist approach. 146 For example, John O.
Honnold, a renowned scholar of commercial law and the former Secretary of
UNCITRAL, argued that Article 8 of the CISG, which requires courts to give
“due consideration” to all the relevant facts and circumstances in determining the
parties’ intent, 147 should preempt the domestic parol evidence rule. 148 This
argument was based on Honnold’s view that “the Convention displaces domestic
law governing validity issues if its provisions and general principles address the
issue and provide a solution on the same operative facts.” 149 Because the CISG
addressed whether intent to be bound by the contract and its terms can be shown

145

146
147

Wales” and “Indian legislation is under the strong influence of British and American law, and judges
often rely on foreign court rulings in interpreting domestic statutes and international instruments”).
I focus on formation validity because my main purpose in this Comment is to show that smart
contracts could meet the formation requirements for traditional paper contracts under the CISG.
Other issues related to validity, such as coercion or duress, are beyond the scope of this Comment.
See Leyens, supra note 131.
CISG, supra note 75 at art. 8.
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See Marlyse McQuillen, The Development of a Federal CISG Common Law in U.S. Courts: Patterns of
Interpretation and Citation, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 509, 520–21 (2007).
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by evidence outside of a written document, Honnold concluded that the CISG
displaced the parol evidence rule. 150
U.S. Courts followed Honnold’s interpretation of Article 8. For example, the
Eleventh Circuit in MCC-Marble Ceramic Center, Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D’Agostino
S.P.A. 151 held that Article 8 of the CISG rejected the parol evidence rule. The
court maintained that because Article 8 did not require that a contract be
evidenced in writing, it was clear that the CISG demanded the consideration of
parol evidence to the extent that it revealed the intent of the parties. 152 In addition,
in Asante Technologies v. PMC-Sierra, 153 when the parties disputed whether the CISG
or state law was applicable to their case, the Ninth Circuit held that the preemption
of state law by the CISG was consistent with the congressional intent of ratifying
the CISG. The Ninth Circuit further supported this point by pointing to the goal
of the Convention to develop uniform international contract law, arguing that it
would be frustrated if state law could override any of its provisions. 154 The Ninth
Circuit also used academic commentary to bolster its arguments. 155
Therefore, given that U.S. courts tend to follow the internationalist approach
of the majority of scholars in considering Article 4’s validity clause, it is
appropriate to also take the internationalist approach to the hypothetical smart
contract above, which is also situated in the context of the U.S. court system.

2. A broad interpretation of Article 4 is inconsistent with the intent
of Congress.
In U.S. law, the issues of contract formation and validity are often
intertwined. To give an example, it sometimes requires a written instrument to
prove the parties’ “intention to create legal relations”—an important element of
contract formation. 156 In fact, the majority of states require contracts to be in
writing for sales of goods worth at least $500. 157 Without such a written instrument
to show that the parties intended to be legally bound, the agreement may be held
unenforceable, or invalid. However, this written requirement directly conflicts
with Articles 8 and 11 of the CISG, which permits contracts to form without a
150
151
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155
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See id.
MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr. v. Ceramica Nuova D’Agostino S.P.A., 144 F.3d 1384, 1390 (11th Cir.
1998).
See id. at 1389.
164 F. Supp. 2d at 1142.
See id. at 1151.
See id.
Nadia Evans, First Principles of Contract Formation, 6 CORP. & COM. DISP. REV. 1, 18 (Mar. 2018),
http://perma.cc/VSX4-2R3L.
U.C.C. § 2-201 (Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n 1977).
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written instrument and allows an offeror’s intention to be bound to be evidenced
by facts and circumstances outside of a written document pertaining to the
agreement. 158
Under the broad interpretation of Article 4, where validity is determined only
on the basis of domestic law, a contract that lacks a written instrument when
domestic rules require it would be held invalid even though Articles 8 and 11 do
not require a written instrument for any contract under its scope. This would make
Articles 8 and 11 completely inapplicable to most international sales contracts.
However, this outcome would be inconsistent with the intent of Congress in
adopting and ratifying the CISG. As mentioned above, Article 96 of the CISG
allows countries to make a reservation to Article 11, but the U.S. never made this
reservation. 159 Congress’ silence means the courts’ approach is instructive. Given
that the U.S. courts have tended to gravitate toward the narrower interpretation
of Article 4’s clause on validity, the internationalist approach to Article 4 is better
than the broader approach in considering the validity of smart contracts in the
U.S. legal system.

B. Formation Validity of Smart Contracts: The Offer
The provisions of the CISG embody “a liberal approach to contract
formation and interpretation, and a strong preference for enforcing obligations
and representations customarily relied upon by others in the industry.” 160 It is in
light of this broad approach to contract formation and to enforcement of contract
obligations that the validity of smart contracts will be considered in this Comment.
Because contract formation under the CISG is based on the offer and
acceptance model, I will begin by exploring whether a proposal to make a contract
that is written in code form in a smart contract would constitute an offer under
the requirements of Article 14.
To recap, under Article 14 of the CISG, a proposal to enter into an
agreement becomes an offer when there is an offer addressed to at least one
specific person, the offeror has indicated an intention to be bound by the
agreement upon acceptance, and the offer is sufficiently definite because it
indicates the goods, quantity, and price. 161 To go back to our hypothetical smart
contract above, Company A is making an offer to Company B to pay $1,000 for
100 of Company B’s electronic motors if the motors are received by a certain time.

158
159
160
161

See CISG, supra note 75, at arts. 8, 11.
See Jurney, supra note 111.
Geneva Pharms., supra note 132, at 281.
See CISG, supra note 75, at art. 14.
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1. It is possible for an offer written entirely in code to be addressed to
a specific person.
A proposal to create a contract that is written entirely in code can be
addressed to at least one specific person, and this can be accomplished by sending
direct messages to the other party in the blockchain-based platform or by email.
First, offers directed to a person or a group of people can be translated into
code. 162 For example, AXA, a French insurance firm, is currently testing a product
called Fizzy, which “will store and process payments” via smart contracts built on
Ethereum’s blockchain. 163 If a customer buys flight-delay insurance on the Fizzy
platform, a smart contract will be created that will automatically compensate them
in the event of a flight delay. 164 Presumably, if smart contract codes could not
handle offers addressed to specific customers, then it would not be possible for
AXA to test automated payments via smart contracts to specific customers based
on certain conditions.
However, to make it even clearer that Company A’s offer is specifically
addressed to Company B, Company A can send its proposal in code form directly
to Company B. Imagine that Company A and Company B already have account
addresses on a blockchain-based platform due to a prior smart contract
agreement. Some blockchain-based platforms will allow Company A to copy and
paste its coded proposal to initiate a new smart contract into a message system
and send it directly to Company B’s address. 165 There are, of course, other ways
for Company A to send its proposal in code form to Company B. For example,
Company A could simply copy and paste the code into an email and send it to the
appropriate email address of an executive working for Company B. The moment
that this message reaches Company A’s server is the moment that the offer
becomes effective. 166

2. The offeror can indicate an intention to be bound both in and
outside of a smart contract.
Under the CISG, the parties’ intentions are of paramount importance in
contract formation, so much so that the Convention allows the parties to “vary
the effect” of the other provisions on contract formation as long their intentions
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See Cardozo Blockchain Project, supra note 52, at 6–8. See also Ricardo Corin, et al., A Secure Compiler
for Session Abstractions, 16 J. COMPUTER SEC. 1, 1–5 (2008).
Maria Terekhova, AXA Turns to Smart Contracts for Flight-Delay Insurance, BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept.
15, 2017), http://perma.cc/UC3T-MRED.
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to be bound by the contract are clear. 167 Conversely, even if an offer is sufficiently
definite and is addressed to at least a specific person, a proposal to create a
contract will not be considered an offer if it cannot be shown that the offeror
intended to be bound by the proposal. 168 This is because “a proposal does not
always aim at concluding a contract but may perhaps be aimed at taking up
negotiations on a sale.” 169 Thus, if an offeror can show its intention to be bound
by a proposal to contract even though the proposal is in pure code form, then it
will be easier to argue that it is an offer under Article 14.
Article 8 allows the offeror’s intent to be bound to be proven by “all relevant
circumstances,” including the statements and the conduct of the parties before and
after the contract has been performed. 170 Prior usages and practices established
between the parties or industrial practices can also prove an intent to be bound.
Thus, Company A may be able to show that it intended to be bound by its
proposal to Company B by pointing to prior agreements with similar
arrangements. For example, if Company A had made the same offer laid out in
the hypothetical above once before and had performed the contract, then it can
use this fact as evidence of its intention to be bound by subsequent similar
agreements. In addition, if it becomes industrial practice to send serious offers in
pure code form, then this could also be used to show that Company A made an
offer in accordance with Article 14’s requirements.
Another way to show the offeror’s serious intent to contract is through the
setting up of the smart contract between Company A and Company B. As
mentioned above, smart contracts are self-executing contracts, and once certain
conditions are met, the transactions that the smart contract was encoded to
perform are typically unstoppable without an emergency stop mechanism. 171
Thus, if a smart contract is set up between Company A and Company B according
to the agreement laid out in the hypothetical above, then once Company B sends
Company A one hundred motors by the specified time, the smart contract will
automatically execute the terms of the agreement and $1,000 will be sent from
Company B’s account to Company A’s account. Thus, if Company A knew or
should have known the self-executing nature of smart contracts, the very act of
setting up a smart contract between Company A and Company B can be used to
prove Company A’s intent to make a legally binding offer.
167
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Finally, Company A can also show its serious intent to make an offer by not
incorporating an emergency stop in the smart contract code that would have
allowed it to halt a smart contract mid-transaction even when it could have. 172 This
shows that Company A may have been trying to signal to Company B that it was
committed to its offer by setting up a smart contract that was unstoppable once
certain agreed upon conditions were met.

3. It is possible for an offer written entirely in code to be sufficiently
definite.
An offer written in smart contract code can indicate the goods, quantity, and
price that the parties agree to in the contract. For example, currently, smart
contracts are used for selling digital tokens in exchange for money or other types
of tokens. 173 These smart contracts indicate the price the offeror is willing to sell
the tokens for, the goods that are to be transferred (tokens), and the amount of
the tokens to be transferred. 174 Similarly, the hypothetical offer above includes the
price ($1,000), goods (electronic motors), and quantity (one hundred motors).
Thus, it is possible for offers written entirely in code to be sufficiently definite.

C. Formation Validity of Smart Contracts: The Acceptance
Under Article 18 of the Convention, an acceptance is any statement or
conduct by the offeree that indicates an assent to the offer. 175 One of the clearest
ways that Company B can show through its conduct that it understood and
assented to Company A’s offer is by performing according to the terms of the
contract without conditioning its assent on additional terms. For example,
Company B could accept Company A’s offer by delivering the one hundred
electronic motors before December 24th without indicating it wanted the price for
the motors to be higher.
Another way Company B could show that it assented to sending the
electronic motors according to the terms of Company A’s smart contract is by
“provid[ing] its digital signature utilizing a cryptographic [private] key” to sign the
transaction before the offer expires on the 23rd of December. 176 Under the
172
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See Julian Jarvis & Ch’ng Li-Ling, Raising Capital in the Digital World, THE BUSINESS TIMES (Sept. 27,
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Convention, “signing” a smart contract with a code-based digital signature is as
valid as signing a traditional contract with a real or electronic signature. First,
under Article 18(2), an acceptance becomes effective and the contract is
concluded when “the indication of assent reaches the offeror . . . within the time
[the offeror] has fixed or, if no time is fixed, within a reasonable time.” 177 As stated
by Article 11, a contract does not need to be concluded by writing but can be
“proved by any means.” 178 Considering that “any means” refers to a broad range
of methods to concluding a contract, signing a contract using code-based
technology should be able to fall under this category. Second, an acceptance may
be effective when “an electronic indication of assent has entered the offeror’s
server” as long as the offeror has had the opportunity to access this indication of
assent by the offeree. 179 As the offeror and party to the smart contract, Company
A will be able to access and see all digital signatures and signed transactions by
other participants in the smart contract. 180 Thus, as Company A is able to view
Company B’s digital signature and because Company A initiated the wholly codebased agreement, Company A should have adequate notice of and access to
Company B’s acceptance in the form of a digital signature.

D. Electronic Contracts under Article 13
Even if smart contracts can meet the Convention’s formation requirements,
some scholars still raise doubts about whether a smart contract can even be
considered a legal contract given its unique technological character. First, smart
contracts were invented long after the Convention was signed, raising concerns
about whether the Convention applies to smart contracts even if the original
drafters did not contemplate their use in the text. 181 Second, some scholars argue
that smart contracts are not legal contracts because they are not agreements
between people but rather merely an enforcement mechanism of an underlying
agreement. 182 To address these two concerns, it is important to first consider
Article 13 and the interpretation of its scope.
Although neither the Convention nor its drafters explicitly considered or
mentioned smart contracts, the text and legislative history of Article 13, case law,
keys to commit their resources to the smart contract is proof of such an intent [of acceptance]”);
BLUECOAT, A MAGNITUDE OF CHANGE 66 (2018), http://perma.cc/7HJ2-42VX.
177
178
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and subsequent UNCITRAL legislative texts all suggest that smart contracts are
legal contracts and included within the scope of the CISG.
First, Article 13 states that “[f]or the purposes of this Convention ‘writing’
includes telegram and telex.” 183 The use of the word “includes” suggests that other
forms of communication—including electronic forms of communication—may
be considered a “writing” that can be used to prove that there was a contract. 184
The few cases that have considered Article 13 have interpreted it to include more
than just telegram and telex. For example, in one case decided by the Supreme
Court of Egypt, the Court concluded that the definition of writing under Article
13 was “flexible enough to include telex, fax, e-mail and other electronic means
of communication.” 185
Should smart contracts be considered a form of electronic communication?
According to the authors of Contracts Ex Machina, Werbach and Cornell, smart
contracts do not really communicate anything as they are not themselves legal
agreements between actual people. 186 Instead, Werbach and Cornell contend that
the actual parties to a smart contract are cryptographic keys, and that the power
of the performance of the smart contract is given entirely to the “machine” of the
smart contract technology because of its self-executive nature. 187
UNCITRAL’s legislators, however, take a different view. First, the
UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce with Guide to Enactment
1996 states that data messages—defined as encompassing “all types of messages
that are…in essentially paperless form” and generated automatically by
computers—should be treated as “‘originating’ from the legal entity on behalf of
which the computer is operated.” 188 Thus, the cryptographic keys that the parties
use to indicate their assent to the smart contract should be treated as originating
from the parties because it is on their behalf that the smart contract is operating. 189
Moreover, if the power of the performance of the smart contract is given entirely
to the “machine” of the smart contract technology, it is given because the parties

183
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assented to this type of arrangement by agreeing to the protocol 190 that would
automatically and irrevocably enforce the terms of the agreement embodied by
the code. 191 Thus, the execution of the smart contract communicates the
agreement of the parties to the underlying agreement embodied within the smart
contract code.
In addition, under the MLEC, electronic data interchange (EDI)—the
closest technological equivalent to the smart contract—is considered a form of
electronic communication whose data messages are not automatically treated as
invalid merely because they are in electronic form. 192 In an electronic data
interchange, the electronic exchange of business documents between business
partners is automated by computers. 193 One example of an EDI is when a
computer user clicks the “I accept” button to a digital contract in order to begin
a relationship with an online retailer. 194 Werbach and Cornell attempt to
distinguish EDIs from smart contracts by noting that, although electronic in form,
the substance and execution of EDIs depend on humans, while the substance and
execution of smart contracts depend on machines. 195 However, the substance and
execution of smart contracts also depend to some extent on human beings. The
immutability of a particular smart contract depends on its protocol, which in turn
is determined by its participants. 196 As mentioned above, parties can create smart
contracts that enable emergency stops in case something goes wrong. 197 A smart
contract is created to be immutable for parties that want the extra security that the
terms of the smart contract will be enforced. 198 Moreover, the execution of the
smart contract still depends on the actions of its participants. In the above
example, Company B could indicate acceptance by signing the transaction with a
private key, which would set the transactions in the smart contract in motion. 199
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Furthermore, legislative history suggests that Article 13 expressly included
telegram and telex as writings to emphasize that a particular form of a contract
was not required under the Convention and to include two forms of
communication that facilitated international trade due to their ability to enhance
the speed of communication between the parties. 200 As I will explain in the next
Section, including smart contracts under Article 13 would be consistent with the
drafter’s intent, because smart contracts can facilitate trade by quickly
communicating information from the sellers to the buyers.

E. Legal Issues Unique to Smart Contracts
Smart contracts are unique from traditional paper contracts and EDIs
because they can be designed to immediately and irrevocably perform contracts. 201
The potential irreversibility of smart contract transactions helps to reduce the
transaction costs of monitoring performance and reduces the possibility of a
breach. 202 Once set in motion and without an emergency stop mechanism in
place, the transactions that a smart contract was encoded to perform are typically
unstoppable. 203 This immediacy and irrevocability also distinguishes smart
contract transactions from purchases on Amazon, which are based on executory
contracts—when you buy something from Amazon, you are promising Amazon
to pay your credit card issuer in exchange for that item, and the transfer of money
does not take place immediately. 204 Thus, if you purchase a book on Amazon, you
can still prevent a transfer of money from your bank account by cancelling the
order. 205 By contrast, initiating a smart contract by agreeing to pay for something
is instantly and irreversibly enforced, making the smart contract an essential
component of the enforcement of the agreement itself. 206
The irrevocable aspect of smart contract performance and the potential for
hackers to exploit its bugs have led some scholars to argue that the code cannot
reflect the agreement of the parties. 207 For example, Professor Adam Kolber of
Brooklyn Law School contends that the code cannot be the entire contract
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because such an agreement is “limited by the efficacy of the code itself.” 208 If a
smart contract’s code has a bug that ends up being hacked, then arguably the code
does not reflect the parties’ agreement because the parties intended for the smart
contract to be performed without being exploited by hackers.
To get around this issue, parties can incorporate an emergency stop
mechanism in the smart contract so that the code reflects the parties’ intention to
be bound and to prevent any potential hacks. Even if the parties fail to incorporate
an emergency exit functionality, parties can point to other circumstances outside
of the code to prove their intention to be bound by the code but not by the
hacking event. 209 For example, absent a showing of bad faith, parties could show
how much they invested in creating precise computer code that was rigorously
tested for reliable smart contracting. 210 Moreover, the parties could point to prior
dealings that were successfully carried out and similar to the smart contract in
question, as well as show how they were severely harmed by the hacking itself.

F. Formation Validity of Smart Contracts: A Policy Rationale
Having established that smart contracts with coded terms that represent the
whole agreement can be valid under the Convention’s formation requirements, I
will address why having this broad approach to the legality of smart contracts is
consistent with the goals and principles under which the CISG was created. As
stated above, the ultimate goal of the CISG was to promote international trade,
and one of the ways they sought to accomplish this was to establish a uniform and
fair legal regime for international sales contracts. 211 UNCITRAL hoped that such
a legal regime would especially benefit small enterprises as well as traders from
developing countries, who typically have a hard time achieving a “contractual
balance” with much stronger parties. 212 Including smart contracts within the scope
of the Convention would strengthen a uniform and fair regime for contract law
because of the potential for smart contracts to strengthen the negotiation power
of smaller businesses.
For example, smart contracts can be coded to quickly trace and keep track
of products along the supply chain, which would allow producers from developing
countries to negotiate higher prices as it could “make it easier for them to prove
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the quality of their products.” 213 Having stronger negotiating power would
empower these developers to demand better terms in their contracts and assert
their contractual rights. 214 Recently, Oxfam, a global organization that works with
local communities to fight poverty, launched a pilot program using smart contract
technology to help rice exporters in Cambodia to increase transparency and
traceability in the supply chain. 215 This greater traceability is in turn expected to
help “empower” the rice exporters in negotiating better prices, not only because
it gives them better proof of quality but also because it attracts more competition
for their products. 216
Moreover, if agreements in smart contracts are held as valid contracts under
the Convention, then parties will be more likely to consider smart contracts as an
alternative way to carry out agreements, an outcome that is consistent with the
Convention’s goal of promoting international trade. As mentioned above,
international trade, as it is currently carried out, is a complex and inefficient
process with huge transaction costs due to its paper and labor-intensive nature. 217
In certain Asian countries, high transaction costs create more serious barriers to
trade than import tariffs do. 218 In addition, among transaction costs, information
costs are regarded as one of the most problematic trade barriers, especially when
trading partners come from different cultural backgrounds or the partnership is
new. 219 These information costs reduce trade flows in part because they create
barriers to entry, as trading partners tend to form long-term partnerships to avoid
the informational costs involved in starting a new one. 220
Given that transaction costs reduce trade flows by creating barriers to it, if
smart contract technology can reduce some of these transaction costs, it is likely
that this will promote international trade. Smart contract technology promises to
reduce some of the transactional costs mentioned above by improving the
traceability and transparency of transactions to reduce informational costs,
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automating processes to reduce labor costs, and digitizing all processes to reduce
the reliance on documents. 221
The counterargument to this is that the success of smart contract technology
is not guaranteed, and the current risk of creating an agreement through a largelyuntested smart contract outweighs its benefits. However, as the history of
automobiles and laptops has taught us, technology and business can evolve to turn
what was once considered a passing trend to a widely-used product. 222 Moreover,
smart contract technology has evolved quickly in the past few years, responding
rapidly to inefficiencies in the system. For example, less than two years after a
hacker exploited a loophole in a smart contract’s code that allowed it to steal digital
tokens, programmers developed an “emergency exit” option for users to halt
smart contract transactions that transfer funds to the wrong party. 223 Thus, aside
from the inevitable kinks that must be ironed out once smart contract use
becomes widespread, it is possible for smart contracts to evolve and adjust to the
needs of contracting in the international trade industry.

V. C ONCLUSION
To conclude, a smart contract whose code constitutes the entirety of the
agreement can be valid under the CISG because it can meet the Convention’s
requirements for offer and acceptance under Article 14 and Article 18. Even if
offerors use pure programming language to communicate a proposal to contract,
they can still address specific people in the proposal, show an intention to be
bound by the offer upon acceptance, and indicate the goods, quantity, and price
they are willing to agree to in the proposal. Offerees can indicate their acceptance
to the offer by performing according its terms or by providing their digital
signature. Furthermore, smart contract technology has the potential to promote
international trade by reducing transactional costs, and confirming smart contracts
as a valid alternative to traditional contracts would increase their use, an outcome
that is consistent with the goal of the creation of the Convention.
Smart contracts will continue to change and evolve as logistics and
transportation companies pour money into developing them for practical use. 224
Because smart contracts reduce transaction costs and enhance trade efficiency, it
is possible that smart contract use for international trade agreements will become
pervasive in the future. Thus, is it likely that a future UNCITRAL convention will
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specifically addresses smart contracts and their formation, just as the UNCITRAL
created the Electronic Communications Convention (E.C.C.) to address the rise
of the use of emails in international trade. 225 Until then, the topic of smart contract
validity remains largely unexplored. UNCITRAL and other commentators have
discussed smart contract validity under the E.C.C., 226 but the E.C.C. has not been
adopted by the U.S. 227
Smart contracts can function in a similar way to traditional contracts because
they can meet the formation requirements for regular contracts under the CISG.
Thus, I suggest that UNCITRAL should address smart contracts by treating them
as traditional contracts, either by expressly including computer programming
language as a part of its definition for “writing” in Article 13 of the CISG, or by
creating a new Convention specifically addressing smart contracts that includes
most of the same formation requirements that are found in the CISG.
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